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Many gaps in the protection of refugees can be connected to a de facto transfer of 
responsibility for managing refugee policy from sovereign states to United Nations 
agencies.1 This phenomenon can be seen in dozens of countries in the Middle East, 
Africa and Asia, where the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) or the UN 
Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) manage 
refugee camps, register newly arrived asylum-seekers, carry out refugee status 
determination, and administer education, health, livelihood and other social welfare 
programs.  
 
In carrying out these fun 2 
3 but without the capacity to fully substitute for a 
host government.4 Such situations have been labelled 5 and it is 
UNHCR policy to av 6 Yet they are 
widespread and commonplace nonetheless.  
 
The difficulties that result from state-to-UN responsibility shift are central to current 
discussions about protecting refugees in urban settings and resolving protracted refugee 
situations. The primary solution offered to date, endorsed both by UNHCR and by some 
of its sharpest critics, has been to refocus attention on the primacy of state responsibility. 
Yet a refugee protection strategy focused on getting host governments to replace the UN 
surrogate state is not likely to be politically viable in many countries.  
 
Using Arab states in the Middle East as a focal point, I wish to propose an alternative 
approach for building a foundation for refugee protection. The argument offered is that 
the existence of a UN surrogate state offers important advantages to some host 
governments and can sometimes be a more viable political foundation for refugee 
protection than more conventional notions of state responsibility. Although unsettling to 
traditional assumptions about state responsibility, there are good reasons to seek such 
alternative strategies that may increase the political will of governments to protect 
refugees in the global south.  
                                                 
1 This paper does not represent the official views of Asylum Access.  
2 
Protracted Refugee Situations 
(Tokyo: United Nations University Press), 123-140.   
3 
ection Standards, 
Supervision of the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol and Other International Instruments, York 
University, Toronto. 
4 International Journal of 
Refugee Law 159, 163. 
5 Journal of Refugee Studies 
54-77. 
6 As 
a general rule, when working in urban areas, UNHCR will avoid the establishment of separate and parallel 
services for its beneficiaries, and will instead seek to reinforce existing fully authorized delivery systems, 
whether they are public, private or community-  
 
 2 
To be clear, I do not argue that state-to-UN responsibility shift is an ideal arrangement. 
There are some essential components of refugee protection that only a sovereign state 
may deliver. Any situation that leads to a perception that UNHCR is a complete 
substitute for a government is bound to produce disappointment and failure.7 UNHCR 
for the protection outcomes that UNHCR will actually be able to deliver.8 
Nevertheless, absent a strategic change in the incentives for host governments, reversing 
the responsibility shift phenomenon is not easy to achieve. Moreover, there are many 
aspects of refugee protection that the UN can deliver effectively, and sometimes better, 
accept such shifts of responsibility, and to use them as opportunities to advance refugee 
protection. Responsibility shift, when used, must be limited and defined, so that lines of 
accountability are clear and expectations realistic.  
This article begins with an overview of the origins of responsibility shift, and offers some 
observations about some of the debates and critiques that have developed around the 
issue. I then attempt to develop a theory about the role of the UN surrogate state in 
refugee policy in Arab states. I then highlight some of the major limitations on the UN as 
a substitute for states, and attempt to propose ways that UNHCR can more effectively use 
limited responsibility shift as a refugee protection strategy.  
 
The origins of responsibility shift 
 
The responsibility shift phenomenon grows from a basic inequality between the global 
north and global south. As James C. Hathaway has observed, the driving purpose of 
refugee law is not specifically to meet the needs of the refugees themselves (as both the 
humanitarian and human rights paradigms would suggest), but rather is to govern 
disruptions of regulated international migration in accordance with the interests of 
states. 9  
 
In general, developed nations of the north accept relatively small asylum burdens while 
most refugees remain in the global south.11 As Amy Slaughter and Jeff Crisp explain, host 
refoulement of refugees if the needs of such populations were fully met by the 
12 This is a daunting challenge since third country resettlement 
                                                 
7 Ibid., 84. 
8 UNHCR, above n. 6, 14-15 para. 84. 
9 Harvard 
International Law Journal 129, 133; See also A. E ction space for Iraqi 
refugees: UNHCR in Syria, Jordan and Lebanon,  New Issues in Refugee Research Paper No. 167, 1 
of refugees, UNHCR must  
11 
Georgetown Journal of International Law 583, 622.  
12 Slaughter and Crisp, above n. 2, 128. 
  
3 
been increasingly viewed by governments as a threat to be contained.13  
 
The stalemate that results from this north-south gap has been bridged, to some extent at 
least, by what Mariano-
refugee policy,14 amounting to an ad hoc form of burden sharing which took shape 
deliver aid to desperate refugees in the south offers northern donor states a channel by 
which to funnel assistance monetarily while simultaneously helping host governments in 
the south to keep refugees from imposing a burden on their own societies.15  
 
When host governments deflect the burden for caring for refugee populations onto 
international actors, they weaken the normal connection between territorial sovereignty 
and state responsibility for people who are present on their territory. Slaughter and Crisp 
describe a general pattern that has emerged from this process. Host governments confine 
themselves to respect for the principle of non-refoulement, and provision of security.17  
 
At the same time, UNHCR and partner humanitarian agencies assume effective 
responsibility for delivering direct assistance to refugees.18 UNHCR in the south often 
19 and 
thus slow the downward spiral of refugee protection that would have otherwise occurred. 
In should be noted that responsibility shift does not take hold everywhere in the global 
south,20 though it is nearly universal in the Middle East.  
 
While the precise division of labour between state and UN varies from country to 
on of 
negative liberties. For refugees, the critical security threats of refoulement and detention 
emanate from the state itself, through deportation or police harassment and immigration 
enforcement.  
 
As a result, host governments can substantially live up to their end of the bargain by 
from deporting them, through a policy of benign neglect. UNHCR and its partners bear 
the heavier load by taking responsibility for refuge
determination, healthcare, education, nutrition and livelihood assistance.  
 
Keeping refugees apart from local populations and dependent on a separate UN-operated 
aid system sometimes finds support in refugee communities. Because of the de facto 
                                                 
13 Ibid., 126. 
14 Cuellar, above n. 11, 622. 
15 Ibid., 659. 
17  Slaughter and Crisp. above n. 2, 124. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid., 123. 
20 Notable exceptions include South Africa, India and Ecuador, among others. Explaining why some states 
opt not to rely on the UN surrogate state would require additional comparative study.   
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division of labour in these situations, refugees learn to expect very little from 
government, and a great deal from the UN. In many situations, refugees come to prefer 
UNHCR over host governments as their protector, orientating their aspirations toward 
third country resettlement to (primarily to the United States, Canada and Australia).21 
22  
  
Palestinian refugees in the Middle East are the paradigmatic example of this 
phenomenon, with a nationalist narrative that resists tawtin (local integration) and argues 
that the UN has special responsibility to care for them.23 But this is not exclusive to 
Palestinians. Separation from the local society can support a political orientation focused 
on resettlement or repatriation, which for exile political movements facilitates 
recruitment.24 Refugees may also resist local integration because they have a tense 
relationship with the host population, or in order to maintain their identity in exile.25  
 
 
C riticism and consensus 
 
Conventional notions of state responsibility make accountability relatively 
straightforward so long as sovereign states are paramount, but when UNHCR is acting 
like a surrogate state it is less clear in practical terms who is ultimately responsible for 
protection failures. In theory the principle of state responsibility still holds. For instance, 
states can be held accountable for relying on errant decisions in refugee status 
determination made by UN agencies.26  
 
But this theory is difficult to apply in situations where there are no effective judicial 
authorities accessible to refugees. In situations of responsibility shift, the sovereign state 
exists only far in the background. A legal system that cannot reach the frontline actors 
will risk irrelevance in the real lives of refugees. With ambiguity about who is 
implementing abstract norms.27 
 
The practical reality that UNHCR and its staff wield real power over refugees has 
violating refugee rights.28 Such criticisms sharpened with the 2005 publication of former 
                                                 
21 Ibid., 132. 
22 d the Well-being of Refugees in 
Forced Displacement: Why Rights Matter (Houndsmills: 
Palgrave MacMillan), 71-92, 87. 
23 See generally 
Con Journal of Refugee Studies 417. 
24 Ibid., 135. See also 
o. 75, 5-6. 
25 Slaughter and Crisp, above n. 1, 136. 
26 See D . v. Turkey, European Court of Human Rights, Application Number 24245/03 (22 June 2006). 
27 Forced 
Displacement: Why Rights Matter (Houndsmills: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008), 159-177, 244-246, 245. 
28 -Bond, Rights in Exile: Janus-Faced 
Humanitarianism (Oxford: Berghahn Books), ix.  
  
5 
ook The Turbulent Decade. One group of 
commentators, notably Barbara Harrell-Bond,29 Guglielmo Verdirame,30 Zachary Lomo,31 
and Jacob Stevens,32 has been especially critical of UNHCR, blaming the agency for 
usurping the responsibility of states for refugee policy and facilitating refugee rights 
violations in the process. 
institutional motivation is the pursuit of donor money and institutional power, rather than 
refugee welfare,33 and that UNHCR thus see
itself.34  
 
One reason critics place primary blame on the UN for the creation of the UN surrogate 
state is the deeply embedded assumption in political thought that entities always seek 
greater power for themselves. Many post-colonial countries are the most zealous in 
guarding the traditional concept of state sovereignty over aspirations for global 
cooperation.35 Thus if power shifts from these states to the UN, one could easily assume 
that it must be the work of self-interested UN agencies at the expense of weak host 
governments.  
 
Appearances on the ground can feed this view. In large refugee settlements in Africa, 
Asia and the Middle East one can find a humanitarian infrastructure dwarfing local 
government and dominated by international agencies based in the West, funded by 
Western states, and led by international staff. This gives refugee policy an air of neo-
colonialism, which encourages criticism of the UN for pushing sovereign governments 
aside.  
 
Many of the crit
pointedly contested.36 But for present purposes it is the provocative macro-critique that 
UNHCR wants to take power away from states that deserves attention. By focusing on 
elfish motivations, this group of critics tend to de-emphasize host 
governments as decisive actors in shaping refugee policy in the geopolitical south. This 
37 and thus to the 
conclusion that that UNHCR is the primary cause of protection failures. However, the 
                                                 




Existing International Legal Regime Wor Berkeley Journal International Law 268. 
32 New Left Review, online:  
http://www.newleftreview.org/?view=2644 (last checked 27 Sept 2009). 
33 Ibid.; Verdirame and Harrell-Bond, above n. 29, 34, 272. 
34 Ibid., 288. 
35 T. G. Weiss (2009)  (Cambridge: Polity Press) 
20, 22. 
36 See N. Morris 
Research, Research Paper No 141. 
37 See, e.g., Lomo, above n. 31, 282 (arguing that Kenya confined refugees to camps because UNHCR 
made this a condition for receiving aid); Verdirame and Harrell-Bond, above n. 29, 335-338 (arguing that 
local integration received too little attention in Kenya and Uganda because UNHCR and its donors were 
dedicated to encampment and repatriation). 
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implicit assumption that a sovereign state would not want a UN agency to usurp its 
authority is faulty.  
 
The concept of global governance, which has emerged from the field of international 
relations, offers more useful analytical tools to understand how states may relate to 
agencies like UNHCR on the ground.38 The responsibility shift phenomenon may be best 
understood by extending an analysis recently developed by Thomas Weiss. He argues 
that in the 21st Century the UN confronts a paradox in that international governance 
should be 
39 and yet states continue to be reluctant to surrender their 
sovereignty.40  
 
arena for state decision- -
autonomous secretariats and agencies.41 It is not at all surprising that a state might 
Security Council, and yet might find it advantageous to shift some functional aspects of 
kes hold ad 
hoc, it offers a practical mechanism by which the UN has partially bridged the gap 
between the need for global cooperation and the continued pre-eminence of state-
centrism. This is what makes the grand compromise of refugee policy possible. 
 
The global grand compromise of refugee policy inverts many of the usual incentives for 
states. In the north, governments are usually assumed to want to place firm limits on the 
class of migrants who will be legally recognized as refugees, so as to limit their 
obligations to let them stay. But in the global south governments have an incentive to do 
something their northern counterparts typically resist: expand the refugee definition. 
Formally labelling ibility for 
their care to the international community, while at the same time marginalizing them 
from the host society.42  
 
Once the logic of responsibility shift takes hold, host governments have reason to keep 
refugees segregated and highly visible in order to maintain the pressure on the 
international community to continue to support their care and maintenance.43 Host 
governments become firmly opposed to local integration,44 eliminating one of the classic 
                                                 
38 See: T. G. Weiss and R. Thakur (2010) Global Governance and the UN: An Unfinished Journey 
(Bloomington: Indiana) 6. 
39 Weiss, above n. 35  4 . 
40 Ibid., 19. 
41 Ibid., 8. The concept of a first and second UN is originally traced to Inis Claude, Jr. (1956) Swords into 
Plowshares: The Problems and Prospects of International Organization (New York: Random House). 
42  Recognition in the Urban South: Formal v. de facto 
Refuge 1-26, 15-16. 
43 
Journal of Refugee Studies 347-370, 349. 
44 
Issues in Refugee Research, Research Paper No. 75, 3-4. 
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durable solutions that might resolve a refugee situation.45 They thus oppose including 
refugee aid in their general development programs, as UNHCR advocates,46 leading 
UNHCR to develop parallel and separate assistance programs.47 Thus, when state-to-UN 
responsibility shift happens, we should not hastily assume that it is the UN that wanted to 
the shift to occur. There are powerful political forces that lead states in the south to want 
to transfer their responsibilities to the United Nations, for their own benefit.  
 
While some major critics of UNHCR over simplify political dynamics in blaming 
UNHCR for responsibility shift, it is interesting that they largely agree with official 
UNHCR policy about the remedy. Beyond the blow-by-blow exchanges about the 
culpability of UNHCR for building the surrogate state, both sides agree that state-to-UN 
responsibility shift is fundamentally a bad thing, and that it should be reversed. But how 
might that be accomplished? Stevens for example recommends that UNHCR should re-
48 As soon as 
UNHCR lets go of the reins of power over refugee policy in the south, normal state 
responsibility for refugee protection would be re-established.  
 
A proposal for this type of approach has been offered for Egypt by Tarek Badawy.49 who 
argues that UNHCR should have ceased conducting refugee status determination with 
50 and argues that in 2004 
UNHCR should not have extended temporary protection to Sudanese in order to pressure 
Egyptian authorities to take responsibility for them under the recent Egypt-Sudan Four 
Freedoms Agreement.51 Others have called for similar approaches on a wider scale.52  
 
The real world is more complicated than may be appreciated by formalistic paradigms 
focused narrowly on state sovereignty. When a host state stands back, ad hoc UNHCR 
responses to refugee emergencies lay the groundwork for enduring parallel structures that 
allow host states to avoid protection responsibilities indefinitely.53 In this view, UNHCR 
is pressured by exigent circumstances and sometimes lacking in strategic foresight, but is 
not the primary source of the problem. Even if fully committed in principle to state 
responsibility, UNHCR is often trapped into accepting quasi-government functions 
indefinitely, fearful that if it pulls back refugees would simply be abandoned because host 
governments would turn out to be unwilling to step in.54  
                                                 
45 Slaughter and Crisp, above n. 2, 131. 
46 UNHCR, above n. 6, para. 113. 
47 Slaughter and Crisp, above, n. 2, 131-132. 
48 Stevens, above n. 32. 
49 anding Between Egypt and the Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees: Problems and Recommendations, CARIM Analytic and 
Synthetic Notes 2010/07, European University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies. 
50 Ibid., 12. 
51 Ibid., 14. 
52 The Washington Post 
solution is to remove UNHCR from the equation and help national governments to determine refugee status 
fairly and then adjudicate decisio  
53 
-14 paras 53-59. 




Refugee policy in the Middle East 
Like other troubled regions, the Middle East hosts millions of refugees, just as it produces 
them. By conventional legal measures, most Middle Eastern countries have done very 
little to implement their obligations to protect refugees, in that few have signed the 
Convention and none have passed domestic refugee legislation. Indeed, by these 
traditional legal criteria refugee policy in the Middle East is much less developed than in 
sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
In a recent article, Ruben Zaiotti examined the state of refugee policy in the Middle East 
and found it alarming. He wrote: 
 
Despite its importance, throughout their recent history Middle Eastern 
states have not paid much attention to the issue of forced migration. 
Apart from the Palestinian case, the question has maintained a low 
profile on their political agendas. No formal provision regulating the 
status of refugees has been devised, and few countries in the region 
have acceded to the main legal instruments defining the international 
refugee regime. Policies towards these individuals therefore have been 
formulated on an ad hoc basis. As a result, refugees have enjoyed few 
guarantees and minimal protection.55  
 
issues in the Middle East. First, Zaiotti assumes, incorrectly in my view, that Palestinian 
and non-Palestinian refugees are entirely separate categories that cannot be examined 
together, even though they exist together in the same host countries.56 Second, Zaiotti 
asks statecentric questions to examine whether international refugee law has been 
implemented. Have states ratified the Convention? Have they passed legislation?57 Have 
Arab states developed a successful regional regime to govern refugee status?58  
 
Asking these simple questions leads to the general conclusion that there is basically no 
refugee policy in the Middle East, that there are only refugee problems and  at best  
occasionally some ad hoc and discretionary steps taken to alleviate suffering for short 
periods of time.  
 
                                                 
55 -Palestinian Refugees in the Middle East: Policies and Practices in an 
International Journal of Refugee Law 333-353, 334. 
56 For a development of this argument, see Kagan, above n. 23. 
57 For an overview of laws relevant to refugees in the region, see L. Hilal and S. Samy (2008) Asylum and 
Migration in the Mashrek (Copenhagen: Euro-Mediteranean Human Rights Network), 67-69.  
58 See Barnes, above n. 9, In addition, in the Middle East, a regional regime similar to those in Africa 
or Latin America does not exist. A document that may have represented a starting point for such a regime; 
the Declaration on the Protection of Refugees and Displaced Persons in the Arab World, was drafted in 




Yet, a refugee arriving in a major Arab state will not be in a total vacuum. There are 
some systems in place to receive people fleeing persecution; some refugees are able to 
find shelter, though many people are likely to fall through the cracks and the amount of 
protection available is certainly quite limited. The systems that exist on the ground for 
refugees in the Middle East are essentially off the radar screen of conventional thinking 
in the field of international law because they rely on shifting responsibility from state to 
the UN. The difference in the Middle East is that there are two relevant UN refugee 
agencies, UNRWA for Palestinians and UNHCR for non-Palestinians, and urban settings 
have long been more prominent than rural encampments of refugees.  
 
The surrogate state pattern that Slaughter and Crisp date to the 1960s in Africa developed 
even earlier in the Middle East, with the establishment of UNRWA in the early days of 
the Palestinian refugee crisis. A desire by Arab states to maintain the visibility of the 
Palestinian refugee issue in international politics has long been noted as a reason why 
Arab states preferred to maintain a separate UN apparatus in the form of UNRWA rather 
than incorporate Palestinians into the new international refugee regime in 1950-1951.59 
But focusing on why UNRWA was kept separate from UNHCR skips the threshold 
question: Why was so much emphasis placed on the United Nations to begin with?  
 
 
C itizens, foreigners and sponsors 
 
central governments with elaborate bureaucracies that regulate the status of and deliver 
services to their populations as part of a social contract between citizens and autocrats. 
Damascus are relatively prosperous and expensive when compared to cities such as 
60  
 
With the possible exceptions of Lebanon, Yemen and post-Baathist Iraq (where central 
governments are weak) it is probably an error to think of Arab governments as unable to 
administer refugee policy on their own. It would be more accurate to say that they are 
unwilling, and there are specific reasons why. To understand the reasons, it is important 
to examine the ways in which Arab states are accustomed to dealing with foreign 
populations. 
 
There are substantial ideological obstacles to local integration of any migrants in Arab 
states.61 In a recent study, Gianluca Parolin observed, Citizenship in the Arab world is 
essentially defined by the individual's membership in a kin group, in a religious 
community and in a nation-state. 62 Prospects for naturalization of foreigners are limited 
                                                 
59 J. C. Hathaway (1991) The Law of Refugee Status, (Toronto: Butterworths), 206-207. 
60 
3, 9 para. 34. 
61 Hilal and Samy, above n. 57, 66. 
62 G. P. Parolin (2009) Citizenship in the Arab World: Kin, Religion and Nation State (Amsterdam 
University Press), 115. 
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because, "if not attributed by paternal descent, nationality in the Arab world is essentially 
closed."64  
 
Depending on the political circumstances communal affiliation can work for or against 
integration. In several cases around the Arab world whole kin groups have been de-
nationalized or in a few cases naturalized on a communal basis, typically to serve a local 
political purpose by privileging or marginalizing groups seen as loyal or disloyal to the 
ruling regime.67 Arab states so resist the idea of granting citizenship to a person with 
connections to another state that they are divided on voluntary acquisition of a second 
nationality; some consider it impossible without the consent of the first state of 
nationality based on the principle of perpetual allegiance, while others view it as 
automatically leading to loss of nationality in order to prevent dual nationality.68 
 
But while citizenship in Arab states is inaccessible to most foreigners, Arab countries 
typically tolerate and in many cases welcome large populations of long term foreign 
residents through the widespread usage of the kefala (sponsorship) system, which has 
now become a source of severe criticism by the human rights community because of its 
connection to worker exploitation.  
 
The kefala system is in some respects an extreme version of work permit systems used in 
employee.69 But its distinctive feature is the level of control given to employers over their 
workers, including their ability to move freely, obtain driver
and severely restricting their ability to seek alternative employment.70  
 
Especially in the sphere of domestic work, social scientists have explained mistreatment 
of workers as a reinforcement of patriarchal socia
who work as maids and nannies are treated as subordinate parts of the family structure.71 
While this subordination heightens abuse, it may also entail a paternalistic sense of 
obligation on the part of some employers.72  
 
The kefala system is a legalist means of regulating relations between employers and 
foreign workers, but it is not used everywhere in the region. Egypt in particular has been 
a noted exception where the law does not necessarily allow employment of foreigners in 
most cases, but authorities tolerate it on a wide scale nonetheless.73 In Egypt migrant 
                                                 
64 Ibid. 
67 Ibid., 116-117. 
68 Ibid., 108. 
69 See, e.g., 
 
70 Ibid., 29. 
71 B. Anderson (2000) Doing the Dirty Work: The Global Politics of Domestic Labour (London: Zed 
Journal of E thnic and Migration Studies 581-607, 586. 
72 See generally, 
Journal of Middle East Women's Studies 74-101.  
73 
International Journal on Multicultural Societies 75-90, 78. 
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workers may have (relatively) more control of their lives not because the state protects 
them, but because the state ignores them. An extra-legal existence may be relatively 
preferable to enforcement of a restrictive legal regime.74 But this still leaves a legal sword 
over their heads, since on paper they have no right to do what they are doing. 
 
The symbolic role of third party sponsors 
In neither the kefala system nor in the case of migrants living outside the law are 
foreigners recognized as people with autonomy over their own lives. In kefala, the legal 
relationship between employer and employee appears most analogous to a parent and 
child, or alternatively master and slave.75 What is critical here is that the state recognizes 
the right of the sponsor to have an employee and to make decisions about the employee 
more than it recognizes the rights of the worker. The 
is mitigated through the third party sponsor, thus facilitating the hosting of foreigners 
without creating a binding relationship between foreigners and host states.  
 
This idea of a third party sponsor is important for understanding how Arab states have 
responded to the presence of refugees in their countries, beginning with the Palestinians 
in 1948. At the birth of the Palestinian refugee crisis, Arab states faced a political 
challenge. There was, and largely still is, a popular Arab consensus insistent on 
Palestinian return as the only acceptable solution to the refugee problem. Yet while Arab 
states have supported and often encouraged this sentiment among their peoples, Arab 
governments have lacked the power to force Israel to accept repatriation.76 Arab host 
states found themselves insisting that Palestinian refugees should go home even though 
they lacked the power to make this happen.  
 
Shifting responsibility for the refugees to the UN defused this tension. It accommodated 
the practical reality of long term exile without surrendering in principle the insistence on 
the return as the only acceptable permanent solution.77 For this political strategy to work 
it would not have been adequate for Arab states to simply persuade the international 
community to share the resource burden of hosting the refugees via humanitarian or 
development aid. Arab states wanted the shift of responsibility for the refugees to the 
public emphasis on 78 This symbolism was important enough that when 
79 
                                                 
74 See Hilal and Samy, above n. 57, Laws on migration that have been adopted in the Mashrek 
countries are mainly repressive and provide no, or very  
75 See generally Jureidini and Moukarbel, above n. 71. 
76  
Benvenisti, E., Gans, C. and Hanafi, S. (eds.) (2007) Israel and the Palestinian Refugees (Berlin: Springer) 
435 463, 441. 
77 Ibid. 





Palestinians were not the first refugee group to be blocked from integration in host 
countries. In December 1946, the United Nations established the International Refugee 
 the case of Spanish Republicans [who should] establish themselves 
temporarily in order to enable them to return to Spain when the present Falangist regime 
new narrative discourse developed by which host states could better justify this limbo 
status.80 
 
This UN responsibility thesis81 is fairly unique to the Palestinian case, but the general 
pattern of state-to-UN responsibility shift is the common foundation of refugee policy for 
both Palestinian and non-Palestinian refugees in Arab host states. The arrangement that 
UNHCR surrogate state in Africa. Both host governments and the refugee community 
opposed local integration. Host governments largely limited their involvement to 
registration, education, health and other social welfare systems separate from those 
operated by the host governments.  
 
The precise demarcation of responsibility varies, with the governments of Syria and 
Jordan offering more to refugees than Lebanon. But UNRWA remains central to 
Palestinain welfare throughout the region. As Nicholas Morris has wri
82  
 
A key lesson from the early days of UNRWA is that responsibility shift offers symbolic 
political benefits to host states, in addition to its utility in facilitating shifting of resource 
burdens.  to symbolically transfer the 
burdens of their welfare to the UN.83 In addition to helping to defray the resource burdens 
of hosting refugees, state avoidance of responsibility helped to deal with political 
sensitivities.84 The fact that refugees in the Arab world typically come from other Arab 
League states poses a political problem for host governments that do not want to accuse 
fellow Arab states of persecution.85 It is politically expedient to leave this task to 
rst with 
Palestinians.86 
                                                 
80 Ibid. 
81 see Kagan, above n. 23. 
82 
4, available at 
http://www.un.org/unrwa/publications/pubs08/ProtectionReport_mar08.pdf (last visited 15 February 2008). 
83 -being of Refugees in 
.), Forced Displacement: Why Rights Matter (Houndsmills: 
Palgrave MacMillan) 71-92, 86. 
84 Ibid., 80. 
85 Ibid., 76. 




 historical origins of Arab state reliance on 
UNRWA and Parolin's analysis of Arab citizenship, we can develop a theory explaining 
Arab states' approaches toward refugees more generally. First, in general Arab states are 
accustomed to hosting large numbers of foreigners but are not open to offering permanent 
integration to them absent exceptional political calculations.  
 
Second, shifting responsibility for refugee populations to UN agencies can provide a 
ready explanation for the otherwise contradictory facts of long-term residence and non-
integration of refugees. In the absence of a foreign state of origin or employment sponsor 
that can take responsibility for the migrants, visibly attaching a group of foreigners to the 
UN can serve to explain why they cannot be (and need not be) integrated to the host 
community.  
 
One can see the symbolic utility of a third party sponsor in the otherwise anomalous 
example of Egyptian treatment of Palestinian refugees. Egypt is the only state bordering 
Israel/Palestine where UNRWA does not operate.87 The historical explanation for this is 
unclear. According to official accounts from the United Nations, UNRWA chose not to 
provide assistance to Palestinians in Egypt because of insufficient resources.88 
 
But according to other accounts, the Egyptian Government decided not to request 
Egypt.89 The number of Palestinian refugees who entered Egypt in 1948 was relatively 
small,90 and Egyptian authorities sought to contain the refugees in the Gaza Strip, which 
was under Egyptian military occupation from 1949 to 1967 and where UNRWA did 
operate.91  
 
For those few Palestinians who remained in Egypt, the Egyptian Government essentially 
invented a third party sponsor where none otherwise existed. For Palestinians in Egypt in 
the 1950s, the functions that today might be carried out by UNHCR were undertaken 
instead by the Cairo-
be a Palestinian government in exile. Beginning in 1950, Palestinian refugees in Egypt 
received travel documents and birth certificates from GAP, and then were allowed to 
receive residence permits from the Egyptian authorities.92   
 
In general, the theory I am suggesting is that Arab governments are likely to acquiesce to 
the presence of refugees on their territory only so long as responsibility for their 
maintenance and ultimate departure from the country is visibly assigned to an 
international body or other third party. Efforts to integrate refugees are likely to be 
blocked either by explicit policy or by the grinding resistance of what Parolin calls the 
                                                 
87 UNRWA maintains a liaison office in Cairo, but does not carry out refugee assistance programs in Egypt.  
88 L. Bartho Refugee Survey Quarterly. 
89 O. El-Abed (2009) Unprotected: Palestinians in Egypt since 1948 (Ottawa: IDRC), 36. 
90 Ibid., 17.  
91 Ibid., 19. 
92 Ibid., 37. 
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"silent machinisations" of the state.94  
 
But w
contradiction between the presence and non-integration of refugees. They might resolve 
this contradiction in the Egyptian manner, through systemic non-enforcement of laws on 
the books, leaving refugees in a fragile state outside the rule of law. A state might try to 
regularize the status of refugees by creating an alternative third party sponsor. Or, the 
state might respond by simply expelling them.   
 
The idea that the UN is functioning as a sponsor of refugees raises intriguing questions 
about protection strategy. In Lebanon in 2008, UNHCR agreed to pay illegal entry fines 
for Iraqi refugees held in detention, in exchange for their temporary release.95 But 
Lebanese authorities released the refugees with only a three-month visa, during which 
time they had to find an employer or become illegal again.96 Such measures raise 
concerns about whether UNHCR might be incentivizing detention by paying fines on 
behalf of refugees. But there is also implied possibility.  
 
If UNHCR can secure temporary release by paying a fine (reportedly $630 per refugee),97 
sponsorship of a foreigner involved a $300 fee, proof of a $1000 bank deposit, and 
provision for medical tests and insurance. Such a strategy would appear crude because it 
makes the responsibility shift explicit, based on a transparent payment of money, but it 
might not fundamentally alter the de facto arrangements that exist anyway. If sponsorship 
 it not be a 
strategy worthy of consideration? 
 
The symbolic power of a third party in normalizing the status of foreigners is a critical 
were solely resource-driven, UNHCR could induce a government to take responsibility 
for critical functions by providing the necessary funds. For example, in Africa and Latin 
America UNHCR sometimes provides the funding for a government to establish its own 
refugee status determination apparatus. In general, the symbolic importance of having a 
visible third party take responsibility for refugees is likely to lead governments to 
generally prefer parallel structures, even if a more integrationist approach would offer 
equal benefits in sharing material resources. 
 
The M O U: A shadow legal regime? 
While the Refugee Convention is not widely ratified and even less commonly followed 
by Arab states, the bilateral Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between UNHCR 
                                                 
94 Parolin, above n. 62, 128. 
95  
96 Ibidd. 





and host governments has emerged as an alternative legal instrument for regulating the 
status of refugees in several countries. These MOUs, which UNHCR has reached with 
Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon, occupy an ambiguous place in international law, for reasons 
I explain below.  
 
These documents formalize the responsibility shift arrangement, and come closer than 
more conventional sources of international law to describing the real refugee system on 
the ground. While the Refugee Convention defines refugee status and rights, the central 
focus of the MOUs is on codifying the division of labour between host governments and 
UNHCR.  
 
memorandum of understanding with the government in 1954.98 Its terms were quite 
general relative to later MOUs, but nevertheless were clear about the state v. UN division 
of labour 99 and would coordinate 
100 There was no explicit 
reference to registration and refugee status determination, which have in practice been 
 
 
But these roles were 
governmental authorities in view of undertaking the census of and identifying the 
101 For its part, the 
fall within the High Comm 102 Egypt promised no other rights to 
refugees, and the agreement indicates that only repatriation or resettlement would be 
considered as durable solutions. UNHCR agreed to facilitate voluntary repatriation,103 and 
in every possible measure, to the countries of immigration, the 
104 In practice the arrangement described in Memorandum of 
1981.105  
 
Where the Egypt MOU was general, later agreements between UNHCR and Arab states 
have been more specific. Jordan reached an agreement with UNHCR in 1997106 
                                                 
98 Accord entre le Haut Comissariat des Nations Unies pour les Réfugiés et le Gouvernement Egyptien, (10 
February 1954) online: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3edf49814.html [accessed 30 September 
2009]. 
99 Ibid., article 2(d). 
100 Ibid., article 2(e). 
101 Ibid., article 2(a). 
102 Ibid., article 6. 
103 Ibid., article 2(b). 
104 Ibid., article 2(c). 
105 
International Journal of Refugee Law 1, 4-5. 
106 Agreement Between the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees, (30 July 1997) online:  
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3a124.html [accessed 30 September 2009]. 
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in 1998,107 as well as a temporary agreement in 2003 which was specific to Iraqi 
refugees.108 In Lebanon UNHCR operated for several decades according to an unwritten 
Following several years of systematic detention and deportations, especially to Iraq and 
Sudan, UNHCR reached an MOU with the Lebanese Government in 2003.109  
 
The Jordan and Lebanon agreements contain several common features, beginning with 
the explicit statements that these are transit countries only. The Jordan MOU describes 
110 while the Lebanon agreement says in the 
111 The Jordanian agreement incorporated 
112 but the Lebanese version offered a 
-
113 Both agreements assigned 
responsibility for refugee status determination to UNHCR.114 
 
A structural flaw in these agreements is that the parties lack the actual capacity to deliver 
on their substantive commitments. The Jordanian and Lebanese MOUs give force to the 
in the case of Jordan 115 and 12 months in Lebanon.116 Because of the strict time limits, 
endeavour  117 to seek a durable solution 
elsewhere. The prescribed timelines create a significant protection gap since only in 
exceptional cases is UNHCR able to resettle a refugee within one year of her arrival.  
 
Even if the time limits were extended, UNHCR has no authority to force resettlement 
political rights o
-
giving interviews to the media. In the case of violation UNHCR would endeavour to 
resettle recognized refugees.118 One should question whether UNHCR has the legal 
 
                                                 
107 Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Jordan and UNHCR, (5 April 
1998), online: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b31920.html [accessed 30 September 2009]. 
108 Letter of understanding between the government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the Office of 
the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, 2222 UNTS 213-216. 
109 Memorandum of Understanding between the Directorate of the General Security (Republic of Lebanon) 
and the Regional Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Concerning the processing of cases 
of asylum-seekers applying for refugee status with the UNHCR Office, 9 September 2003. 
110 Memorandum (Jordan), above n. 107, article 5. 
111 Memorandum (Lebanon), above n. 109, Preamble. 
112 Memorandum (Jordan), above n. 107, article 1. 
113 Memorandum (Lebanon), above n. 109, Preamble (internal punctuation original). 
114 Memorandum (Jordan), above n. 107, article 2(2), 3; Memorandum (Lebanon), above n. 109, article 8. 
115 Memorandum (Jordan), above n. 107,, article 5. 
116 Memorandum (Lebanon), above n. 109, articles 5 and 9. The MOU provides for an initial 3 month visa 
for asylum-seekers, then 6 months for recognized refugees, extendable by another three months. 
117 Memorandum (Jordan), above n. 107. 




Despite these limitations, the MOUs contain some substantial advances for refugee rights 
in countries that have not ratified the Refugee Convention. The Jordanian government 
agreed to abide by the principle of non-refoulement,119 and both the Jordanian and 
Lebanese agreements guaranteed that UNHCR would be able to conduct RSD with 
asylum-seekers who entered the country illegally.120 In Lebanon, the government 
promised to notify UNHCR about detention of asylum-seekers,121 though there was no 
provision actually regulating when they can be detained and no ironclad guarantee that 
UNHCR would actually be able to access them.122  
 
In all these MOUs, responsibility for most social and economic concerns was assigned to 
UNHCR, though the Jordanian government agreed in vague terms to also play a role. In 
123 
admission and immigration procedures, in accordance with the principle of non-
refoulement 124 and for registration of refugees.125  
 
national institutions,126 
tion and other social services for Iraqis.127 This formulation 
left the precise division of labour between the government and UN somewhat ambiguous, 
with the exception of food assistance, for which the World Food Programme was 
assigned primary responsibility.128 In Lebanon the division of labour was more black and 
national laws or constitute a burden on the Lebanese Government.129 
 
The case of I raq 
The willingness of Arab states to host large numbers of refugees with limited rights has 
been illustrated by their response to the Iraqi refugee crisis since 2003. The Iraq response 
assisting urban refugees,131 and has been thoroughly profiled elsewhere.132 In general, 
                                                 
119 Ibid., article 2. 
120 Ibid., article 3. 
121 Memorandum (Lebanon), above n. 109,article 12. 
122 Cf. Ibid., article 13. 
123 Memorandum (Jordan), above n. 107, article 11. 
124 Letter, above n. 108, article 3(1.5). 
125 Memorandum (Jordan), above n. 107, article 3(1.6). 
126 Ibid., article 3(1.10). 
127 Ibid., article 3(2). 
128 Ibid., article 3(2.1). 
129 Memorandum (Lebanon), above n. 109, article 14. 
131 See generally, Crisp et al, above n. 60. 
132 Ibid.; see also Barnes, above n. 9. 
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was expanded beyond early expectations,133 especially in view of the fact that the key host 
states are not parties to the Refugee Convention and are opposed to local integration of 
refugees.134  
 
Although governments did open some services to refugees in the fields of education and 
health,135 the response to the Iraqi refugee crisis was in others ways to strengthen the pre-
existing UNHCR surrogate state. UNHCR experimented with new means of directly 
delivering food and monetary assistance to needy refugees136 and carried out reception 
and registration.137  
 
Whether services were delivered by governments or UNHCR, much of this success has 
been attributed to the high interest of donors and resettlement states in the Iraqi refugee 
issue, allowing UNHCR to mobilize considerable resources for responsibility sharing.138 
already seen. In fact, the Iraq crisis might have been the best possible scenario for the 
grand compromise to work. As a UNHCR-PDES study warned With donor support now 
likely to decline, UNHCR will be confronted with some hard questions with regard to the 
sustainability of the programme and the need to prioritize some activities while reducing 
or phasing out others. 139 
 
It is important to remember that the Iraq operation has been a relative success. Iraqi 
refugees have not in general been granted the right to work, and thus survive through 
informal economic means.140 Their legal status and security are not stable, and there have 
been reports of deportations.141 Although Arab host states could certainly have treated 
Iraqi refugees more har
142 without a durable solution. Only general improvements on the ground in Iraq 
offer some hope that this will not become a large scale protracted refugee situation 
similar to what Sudanese, Somalis and Palestinians have experienced in the Middle East.  
 
The PDES report recommended that UNHCR continue to seek incremental improvements 
in protection space, guided by a rights-based, holistic and community-oriented concept of 
refugee protection.143 
responsibility.144 To develop such a strategy, UNHCR will need to develop a coherent 
                                                 
133 Crisp, et al, above 60, 15-16, para 54. 
134 Ibid., 16, para. 56. 
135 For instance, with UNHCR financial contributions Syria and Lebanon opened schools to Iraqi children. 
Ibid., 40, paras. 183-184. Iraqi refugees also had access to health clinics on a basis similar to nationals in 
Jordan and Lebanon. Ibid., 39 paras. 177-178.  
136 Ibid., 36-37. 
137 Ibid., 21-23. 
138 Ibid., 16, paras. 57-59. 
139 Ibid., 41, paras 190-191. 
140 Ibid., 17 para 65. See also Barnes, above n. 9, 21. 
141 Ibid., paras. 62, 66. 
142 Ibid., 17 para. 65. 
143 Ibid., 19 para. 74-75. 
144 Ibid., 19, paras. 77-78. 
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approach to the responsibility shift dilemma. If it is not possible to ask host states to take 
on all responsibility for refugee protection, what responsibilities can be shared with 
UNHCR, and what responsibilities cannot? 
 
 
The limits of the surrogate state 
 
A UNHCR surrogate state is not a complete substitute for an actual state, in large part 
because UNHCR ultimately has limited power to restrain a government determined to do 
ill to refugees.  A vivid example of this occurred a decade ago in Lebanon, when 
UNHCR conducted refugee status determination and the Lebanese authorities simply 
hundreds of refugees and asylum-seekers.145  
More recently, Lebanon has presented a more complex scenario. On the one hand, 
refugees,146 a relatively rare example of a state extending protection of positive liberties to 
refugees. Yet protection of negative liberties remains deeply problematic. UNHCR 
recently reported that long term detention of refugees, including children, are continuing 
concerns in Lebanon. 147 
Another ominous warning about the limitations of responsibility shift may be recent 
changes in Egyptian practice toward refugees and asylum-seekers. Over five decades 
Egypt built a solid record of observing the principle of non-refoulement by respecting 
al welfare. But in recent years this arrangement in Egypt 
was disrupted. In 2004 UNHCR suspended refugee status determination for most 
Sudanese in Egypt in favour of temporary protection,148 and moved away from large scale 
resettlement leaving many refugees disappointed. 149 This led to immediate refugee 
protests in 2004, and the reported arrests of 23 demonstrators. The following year several 
Mahmoud Square in Cairo culminated in the deaths of 27 people (around half of them 
children) when Egyptian police used force to break up the protest camp.150 
In 2007, a new smuggling route from the Horn of Africa to Israel came to prominence, 
with hundreds and then thousands of Eritreans and then other Africans entering Egypt 
                                                 
145 Kagan, above n. 105, at 6. 
146 
Office of the High Commissioner 
The Republic of Lebanon, 2. 
147 Ibid. 
148 See Hilal and Samy, above n. 57, 38. 
149 
Refugee Research, Research Paper No. 183, 9. 
150 For an accounting of theses events, see A Tragedy of Failures and False Expectations: 
Report on the Events Surrounding the Three-Month Sit-In and Forced Removal of Sudanese Refugees in 
Cairo, September-  The American University in Cairo, Forced Migration and Refugee 
Studies Program (June 2006). 
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illegally intending to transit through the Sinai border to Israel. This raised the political 
costs for the Egyptian Government to host refugees because they now posed a threat to 
 
most sensitive foreign policy theatre. In summer 2007 Egyptian forces began to shoot  
migrants on the Sinai border with Israel, leading to the death of dozens over the ensuing 
two years. Egypt also began to block -seekers in detention, 
especially if they had entered the country illegally, and in 2008 deported Eritreans en 
masse.151  
The right to a livelihood raises a particular sticking point in countries practicing 
responsibility shift. While other social and economic rights (healthcare, education, etc.) 
are typical positive liberties calling for services to be provided to refugees, the right to 
earn an income is actually a negative one - the right to engage in wage-earning 
employment or entrepreneurship without state interference. The UN Development 
single greatest challenge that displaced people encounter, especially where they lack 
152 A recent UNHCR publication reported that of 214 countries surveyed, 
and 32 percent of countries do not even partially meet international law standards.153 
Merely issuing identity papers and residence permits to refugees (which is routinely done 
in several Arab states) does not on its own open legal avenues of employment. In Egypt, 
used o
impossibility for them to obtain a work permit,  more than double the number citing lack 
of skills, cultural or language obstacles, or even general shortage of jobs.154  
 
Restrictions 
assistance programs to alleviate extreme poverty, and also add pressure to resettle more 
refugees for lack of local integration prospects. But this is precisely why restricting 
themselves, it will appear that they are on the road to integration, which is opposed by 
host governments that want the international community to share the costs of hosting 
refugees. While it seems logical that scarce resources should be targeted at the most 
vulnerable, host governments that want to attract the same resources have an incentive to 
make the refugees on their territory as vulnerable as possible.  
 
In a region where states have limited commitment to refugees, priority must be on their 
willingness to recognize their right to basic security. UNHCR could, resources 
                                                 
151 See generally Human Rights Watch (2008) Sinai Perils:Risks to Migrants, Refugees, and Asylum 




and registration for urban refugees  
154 UNHCR Regional Office (Cairo) (2003) Refugee Self-Reliance in Cairo: Obstacles and Prospects, 50. 
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permitting, substitute for many of the functions of education and health ministries. But it 
cannot free refugee children from detention if security agencies, prosecutors and courts 
refuse to do so. Being explicit and clear about the responsibilities that UNHCR can and 
cannot take on is essential.  
 
 
Amending the paradigm: shared responsibility 
 
expression of the basic strategic dilemma which UNHCR faces in Arab states in the 
We were right when we 
decided against any attempt to impose the full refugee regime on the Iraqi refugee 
155 
The prevailing current answer to this dilemma is to re-focus on host state responsibility. 
In its new policy on urban refugee protection, UNHCR has sought to simultaneously 
lower expectations about what UNHCR can accomplish on its own156 while re-
emphasizing the role of host governments.157 In addition to resisting the creation of 
systems.158  
The problem with this approach is that it does little more than state an objective, without 
proposing a strategy by which to achieve it. It has not been my purpose in this paper to 
dispute the objective of states taking responsibility for hosting and ultimately providing 
genuine asylum to refugees. But merely stating the ideal does not make it a reality. 
Given the structural political incentives for states that lead to responsibility shift to begin 
with, it is difficult to conceive of how it can be reversed absent some substantial strategic 
shift. In the Middle East, one would have to find a way to persuade governments to turn 
away from the longstanding ideological opposition to integration of outsiders, a task 
made more difficult by the powerful ideological opposition to integration of Palestinians.  
Certainly any viable strategy would have to involve the cooperation of donor states, but 
the international pressure would need to be considerable. At a minimum, donors would 
need to insist on including refugees in development programs as a condition for receiving 
development aid at all, so that Arab host governments would not perceive a gain for their 
own citizens in marginalizing refugees.  
There is reason for scepticism about whether donor states would prioritize refugee 
welfare enough to place this kind of pressure on host governments,159 and reason for 
                                                 
155 Ibid., 18. For a similar commentary, see Hilal and Samy, above n. 57, 70.  
156 UNHCR, above n. 6, 3 para. 12. 
157 Ibid., 6 para. 27. 
158 Ibid. para. 29. For a stronger articulation of this ideal, see De Lorenzo, above n. 52. 
159 K. Grabska (July 2006) Who Asked Them Anyway? Rights, Policies, and Well-Being of Refugees in 
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worry that even if donors followed this path host governments might still resist for 
ideological reasons. Donors would also have to overcome resentment that they generally 
take on small refugee hosting burdens than many Arab states. As we have seen in 
Lebanon, even when donor assistance opens doors to state-provided health and education, 
refugees can still be in grave danger of detention and refoulement. The risks are clear: 
refugees might be abandoned entirely.  
The primary analytical tools of refugee law are state-centric, making it difficult to 
perceive state-to-UN responsibility shift as anything but an anomaly. Formal 
international law often highlights a stalemate between the principled recognition of rights 
and norms and strong state sovereignty that makes norms difficult to impose or enforce 
directly.160 But despite this paradox, there is possibly more adaptability built in to the 
international system than meets the eye. There is already sufficient flexibility built into 
deliver refugee protection in all circumstances.161  
displacement or statelessness problems unilaterally and in isolation 162 
law: an international institution interceding directly on behalf of distinct individuals and 
163 
My goal here is to point toward a more pragmatic strategy, without compromising on the 
rights that refugees should enjoy, based on the philosophy that legal form should follow 
protection function. The assignment of responsibility for protecting rights should be to 
the institution best positioned to carry out the duty. As a default rule, the state should 
usually be responsible because in the international arena states are presumed to have the 
clearest ability and authority to act. But there are situations where either state capacity is 
lacking, or political constraints lead governments to be unwilling to use it. In these 
situations, the United Nations may be best able to promote the protection of refugees by 
taking on some of the responsibility for refugee protection.  
As Sir Brian Urquhart wrote recently in The New York Review of Books
now is not to abolish national sovereignty but to reconcile it with the demands of human 
survival and decency in the astonishingly dangerous world we have absentmindedly 
164 This adaptation is possible because while governments remain stubbornly 
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committed to narrow national interest at the primary basis for state action,165 sovereignty 
as a concept has proven to be a dynamic concept that can evolve as national interests 
demand.166 States are able to find advantage in shifting functions to international 
agencies, without compromising on their ultimate independence. Responsibility shift 
represents a means of enhancing global cooperation.  
When parallel structures are the most effective means to achieve functional rights for 
refugees, UNHCR need not apologize for them. There are some things that only states 
can do, but there are nevertheless some critical components of refugee protection that 
UNHCR often performs better than many governments.167  Rather than continue to insist 
on pure state responsibility as a policy for all situations, it might be better to build on the 
positive/negative liberties distinction that is in evidence in most responsibility shift 
situations. Wherever direct resources or active implementation are required, the UN 
would take primary responsibility, by operating health programs, paying for schools, or 
carrying out refugee status determination. Negative liberties, which depend on restraining 
state action, would be a state responsibility for the simple reason that these areas of 
protection cannot be transferred. 
When responsibility shift is deeply rooted, the goal should be to identify the bare 
social and economic rights, and to develop incentives for states to do these things, and 
only these things. The UN would take responsibility for all other areas of refugee 
protection. But to be a viable foundation for refugee protection, responsibility shift would 
need to be de jure, not de facto.  
The division of labour between states and the UN would need to be explicit, and the UN 
would need to address its own internal accountability gaps so that it administers services 
consistent with norms of due process. This might be accomplished by pushing for 
stronger MOUs with host governments, in which UNHCR more directly agrees to take on 
certain responsibilities for refugees, in exchange for firmer commitments from 
governments.Table 1: Dividing Roles between UNHCR and States 
 
 
Roles that can shift to  
UN H C R if necessary 
Roles that require state action  
Health services Non-refoulement 
Education* Freedom for arbitrary detention 
                                                 
165 Weiss, above n. 35, 21. 
166 Ibid., 21. 
167 -seekers than 
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Roles that can shift to  
UN H C R if necessary 
Roles that require state action  
Monetary and nutritional assistance Protecting the right to work 
Other social services Police functions and physical security 




* It is preferable for refugee children to be integrated with non-refugees in schools, which could be 
accomplished by UNHCR paying school fees. However, if this inclusive approach is blocked, it is 
preferable for refugee children to attend separate schools rather than none at all. 
 
** UNHCR can pe
from refoulement and arbitrary detention. 
 
 
In many respects, what is outlined here is what UNHCR already does on the ground. In a 
sense, what I am advocating is less a change in practice than a change in norms, based on 
the premise that for refugees, real functional access to the normative rights established by 
law is much more important than the state v. UN division of labour. Excessive focus on 
state responsibility puts UNHCR on the defensive in seeking support (i.e. donor 
contributions) for parallel structures, when stated policy calls for building up host 
government capacities. But in the end it matters much more whether a refugee has access 
to a doctor than whether that doctor is employed by a government or the UN.  
Even if it is less than ideal, state-to-UN responsibility shift has in many ways been a 
successful example of global governance. The UN surrogate state has increased 
international cooperation and navigated political minefields so as to produce a much 





In sum, responsibility shift exists because it addresses political interests of states, both in 
terms of material benefits and symbolic benefits. It serves material resource interests 
because responsibility shift is a means by which states in the south manage to deflect the 
material burdens of hosting refugees onto northern donor states without any formalized 
system by which to achieve meaningful international burden sharing. On a symbolic 
level, responsibility shift helps states that politically could not accept full integration of 
refugees to nevertheless tolerate their long term presence. It also can help reduce the 
political costs for a host state in external relations, in that the host government is freed 
from making key decisions about a refugee population that may be a source of political 




These state interests are reflections of the imperfect world in which we live, but must be 
taken seriously. Calling for states to re-assume their responsibilities for refugee 
protection is essentially a search for a total cure for a serious disease. If this is achievable, 
it should of course be pursued. But the problem is that not every disease is curable, and 
even treatable diseases are not curable for every patient. If this is the case for 
responsibility shift in some countries, then refugee protection should be based on a 
strategy akin to disease management. 
 
These critical functions have come about through a largely ad hoc process in which 
responsibility shift has been treated as an anomaly. My argument is that it might be more 
fruitful to legitimize the UNHCR surrogate state as an effective strategy to promote 
protection, to seek out more effective means to channel the underlying state interests into 
wider protection of refugee rights, and to be more clear about the responsibilities that can 
and cannot be assigned to UNHCR. 
 
The UN surrogate state can be a good thing, and in some cases it should be strengthened. 
When it is the path of least resistance to realizing refugee rights, responsibility shift 
should be considered a legitimate protection strategy. But in so doing, 
responsibilities must be clearly defined and limited, so that there is no implication that 
UNHCR can remedy all problems on its own. For those things that UNHCR can control, 
it should be accountable and due process should apply. But for matters beyond its 
capacities, there should be clarity that responsibility lies with the state.  
